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Abstract 
 
This paper studies Dutertenomics of the Philippines which is regarded as drastic policy 
shift in PPP, Public-private partnership, infrastructure development. While Aquino 
administration focused on PPP-based infrastructure development as a priority policy, 
the Duterte administration launched "Dutertenomics", a large-scale infrastructure 
development plan of about 8 trillion pesos, about 160 billion USD, over 6 years in 2017 
which mainly depends on national budget and ODA as financial source rather than PPP. 
This triggered debate of "PPP vs ODA" in the Philippines. 
 
The paper discusses PPP related policies and measures implemented by Aquino 
administration including government organization, project development fund, PPP fund 
and relaxation of single borrowers' limit. Dutertenomics will be discussed from the point 
of view of 1) acceleration of infrastructure development, 2) shift from PPP to ODA, 3) 
hybrid PPP and 4) financial sources. The paper also examines changes in infrastructure 
development and its policy in the three decades after Marcos administration since 1986 
as a background of these policy shift. The paper discusses that the issue is not about the 
"PPP vs ODA" but how to promote complementary relations between the public sector 
and PPP; in other words “PPP and ODA”.  
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1. Introduction 
In the Philippines, due to the electric power crisis that occurred in the 1980s, 
PPP-related law was established relatively early among emerging economies. The 
Philippine’s BOT, Build-Operate-Transfer, law was enacted in 1990, which was the first 
of its kind in Asia. After that, PPP projects were promoted in sectors including electric 
power, water supply, and transportation. The Aquino Administration, which was 
launched in 2010, made important policy change to develop infrastructure through PPP, 
not through public procurement, mainly to reduce fiscal burden. The policy change 
includes the establishment of a new government agency, called PPP center, to promote 
PPP, and various PPP support systems. 
 
The Duterte administration, launched in 2016, announced "Dutertenomics", a 
large-scale infrastructure development plan of about 8 trillion pesos, about 160 billion 
USD, in April 2017. The plan aims to make a major policy change in infrastructure 
development from PPP of the Aquino former administration to (a) construction of 
infrastructure by public sector by using government budget and Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) jointly, (b) operation and maintenance of infrastructure by the private 
sector, the adoption of "hybrid method". In response to this, debate on "PPP vs ODA" has 
become active in the Philippines. 
 
This paper aims to discuss Dutertenomics of the Philippines, which is regarded as a 
drastic policy shift in PPP infrastructure development, based on a review of relevant 
primary and secondary literature, anecdotal evidence, and the author's own knowledge 
on the subject coming from his involvement with the issue. 
 
In this paper, section 2 discusses current status of infrastructure development and 
achievements in PPP in the Philippines, section 3 depicts overview of infrastructure 
development in the three decades after Marcos administration, and section 4 discusses 
policy shift in the Philippines’ PPP and Dutertenomics. 
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2. Current Status of Infrastructure Development and Achievements in PPP in the 
Philippines 
In this section, current status of infrastructure development and achievements in PPP 
in the Philippines are described. 
 
2-1. Current Status of Infrastructure Development in the Philippines 
Regarding the current status of infrastructure, the Global Competitiveness Index by the 
World Economic Forum is often cited for international comparison in recognized studies. 
According to the Index, ranking concerning infrastructure development status are 
shown in Table 1. The Philippine’s ranking and score are among the lowest in 
comparison with other ASEAN peer countries. In comparison with 2010-2011, there is 
no change in the ranking in 2017-18, while the score itself declined. Meanwhile, both 
Indonesia and Vietnam have greatly increased their ranking and scores. 
 
Table 1 Quality of overall infrastructure Ranking and Score in (  )  
 2010-2011 2017-2018 
Philippines 113 (3.2) 113 (3.0) 
Indonesia 90 (3.7) 68 (4.1) 
Thailand 46 (4.9) 67 (4.1) 
Vietnam 123 (3.0) 89 (3.6) 
              Source: The Global Competitiveness Report 2010-2011 & 2017-2018 
 
UNESCAP’s Access to Physical Infrastructure Index (APII) is based on data from 2013 
to 2015 on the status of infrastructure development in transportation, energy, ICT, 
water supply and sanitation sector among 41 Asian and Pacific Region countries 
(UNESCAP (2017b)). The Philippines ranks 25th in all 41 countries, the score is 0.336, 
far below the average 0.431 in emerging countries in the region. It is lower than other 
ASEAN countries as shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 APII Rank and Score 
 APII Rank APII Score 
Philippines 24 0.336 
Thailand 15 0.418 
Indonesia 27 0.278 
Vietnam 14 0.419 
          Source: UNESCAP 2017b 
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One of the reasons behind this relatively less development of infrastructure in the 
Philippines is the low level of public investment. According to a study by the IMF 
(2015b), the Philippines’ public investment had consistently been the lowest among 
ASEAN countries in the recent past, averaging 2.5 % of GDP in 2000-2013 as shown in 
Figure 1. As a result, the study argues that the public capital stock is also one of the 
lowest among ASEAN countries, standing at around 35% of GDP in 2013 compared to 
the ASEAN average of 72% of GDP as shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 1 Public Investment in percent of GDP 
 
Source: IMF (2015b) 
 
Figure 2 Public capital stock in percent of GDP in 2013 
 
Source: IMF (2015b) 
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2-2. Achievement in PPP Infrastructure Development in the Philippines 
Contrary to the infrastructure development situation, the Philippines’ achievements in 
PPP Infrastructure Development are relatively positive in ASEAN. 
 
In 1990, the first BOT, Build-Operate-Transfer, law (Republic Act (RA) No. 6957) was 
enacted in the Philippines which was the first of its king in Asia, making the 
Philippines the oldest PPP country in Asia. The law was amended by Republic Act No. 
7718 in 1994 to include other schemes such as BOO (Build-Own-Operate).  
 
According to the World Bank PPI Database, PPP projects in the Philippines amounted 
to 56,073 million dollars (149 projects) from 1990 to 2017. In terms of investment value, 
the Philippine is the eighth largest country among emerging countries1. Historical 
investments in PPP for the Philippines is shown in Figure 3. The peak in 1997 and the 
contraction in 2002 go in line with trends in whole emerging and developing countries. 
 
Figure 3 Investments in mil USD in PPP infrastructure projects, 1990-2017 in the 
Philippines 
 
Source: Created by author using World Bank PPI Database 
 
Comparison with ASEAN neighboring countries is as shown in Table 3. This also shows 
that the country has relatively good record of PPP. 
 
 
                                                   
1 Philippine is ranked after Brazil, India, China, Turkey, Mexico, Russia and Indonesia. 
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Table 3 PPP projects for 1990-2017  
 Number of 
Projects 
Investment 
(million USD) 
Philippines 149 56,073 
Thailand 167 39,456 
Indonesia 123 58,856 
Vietnam 96 14,705 
Source: World Bank PPI Database 
 
World Bank PPI Database also shows that of total PPP projects in the Philippines, 
electricity sector accounts for an overwhelming share of 72.4% on the basis of number of 
projects and 66.8% on the basis of investment value. Also, top 6 sponsors by investment 
value in the Philippine during 1990-2017 are all local conglomerates which accounts for 
62.7% of the total investment which is $ 35,143 million. 
 
The World Bank (2018) assesses the PPP environment of 135 economies in four aspects: 
1) preparation, 2) procurement, and 3) contract management, and 4) the management of 
unsolicited proposals (USPs), with scoring of 1-100. Table 4 shows the scores for the 4 
areas of 1) to 4) above for selected countries in Southeast Asia and the average of 
High-income country group. It is noted that Philippines’ score is not only the highest in 
ASEAN but its score is higher than the High-income country group, although the 
Philippines belongs to Lower-middle-income group, which is 2 income groups lower than 
High-income group after Upper-middle-income group. The score of the Philippines is 
high especially in “Preparation” and “Contract Management” aspects. This reflects 
various PPP promotion measures implemented during the Aquino administration 
(2010-2016), which will be discussed in section 4.1.  
 
Table 4 Score for PPP Regulatory Framework (1-100) 
 Preparation Procurement Contract 
Management 
USPs 
Philippines 85 76 88 83 
Thailand 27 45 58 Not regulated 
Indonesia 63 74 58 58 
Vietnam 77 77 62 25 
High-income average 63 77 58 66 
Source: World Bank (2018) 
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The ADB (2017) also tracks the development of the PPP business environment as well 
as the challenges of doing PPPs in nine Asian countries including the Philippines in four 
categories: regulatory framework, institutional capacity, PPP market maturity, and 
financial facilities. Although the report does not have rankings and scores for 
comparison, it points out that “much has been achieved in developing the PPP market 
in the Philippines”2.  
 
Although international recognition of PPP environment of the Philippines is relatively 
positive, results of some of PPP projects are mixed. OECD (2016) argues that the 
Philippine government tended to take excessive risk in past contracts, particularly 
foreign exchange and demand risks, to extend overly generous guarantees, and to 
shoulder heavy contingent liabilities. PPP succeeded in introducing power generation 
projects in the 1990s by mobilizing US $ 8 billion, resulting in additional 8,000 MW 
capacity. On the other hand, in the series of those PPP power projects, the government 
took the demand risk into a "take-or-pay" format. This is part of the reason that the 
current Philippine electricity tariff is one of the highest in Asia. 
 
Another example of government taking of demand risk can be witnessed in Metro Rail 
Transit (MRT) line 3 project, MRT 3, which started operation in 2003 through BLT, 
Build- Lease-Transfer, revenue from train fare accounted only around 30% of operating 
cost and lease fee. In this BLT contract, the government guaranteed IRR of 15% on a 
dollar basis. This BLT contract may affected incentives for efficient operation and 
improvement of services by the private operator. 
 
3. Overview of Infrastructure Development in the Three Decades after Marcos 
Administration 
Addressing issues of infrastructure deficit has been priority for every administration 
after Marcos administration since 1986. In fact, for the last three decades, 
infrastructure development has been one of the core pillars of Medium Term Philippines 
Development Plan (MTPDP) of administrations. Table 5 shows major developments in 
infrastructure- related matters and infrastructure spending against GDP for each 
administration after the Marcos administration. 
                                                   
2 The report discusses that one challenge is the current limit of 40% of foreign 
ownership in the PPP project company in infrastructure projects where the operation 
requires a public utility franchise. 
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Table 5 Major developments in infrastructure related matters and infrastructure 
spending against GDP for each administration after the Marcos administration  
 Major developments in infrastructure related matters 
  
Infrastructure 
spending 
(% to GDP) 
Aquino 
(1986-1
992) 
- Enactment of the Reorganization Act of National Economic and 
Development Authority (NEDA) (Executive Order (EO) 230) : 
socio-economic policy making and project evaluation function was 
transferred from Office of the President (OP) to NEDA 
- Enactment of BOT Law (Republic Act (RA) 6957): first BOT law in 
Asia  
- Enactment of Local Government Code (RA7160) which 
decentralized of government function 
- Introduction of VAT 
2.2% 
Ramos 
(1992-1
998) 
- Enactment of RA7718: Amendments to RA 6957 BOT law  
- BOT Center established under OP 
- Enactment of Comprehensive tax reform law → Tax collection to 
GDP improved to 17% (highest ever) 
- Enactment of Electric Power Crisis Act (RA7648): granted the 
President emergency powers & allowed the entry of private 
power producers → Installed capacity of power increased by 73% 
- Enactment of National Water Crisis Act (RA8041) → 
Privatization of Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System 
(MWSS) . As a result, Manila Water & Maynilad Water took over 
the function of MWSS as private entities. 
- Enactment of Public Telecommunications Policy Act (RA7925) → 
Privatization of the sector 
2.2% 
Estrada 
(1998-2
001) 
- MRT 3 completed  2.2% 
Arroyo 
(2001-2
010) 
- BOT Center moved under Department of Trade and Industry 
(DTI) 
- Enactment of Electric Power Industry Reform Act (RA9136) → 
Privatization of power industry 
- VAT rate increased to 12% 
1.9% 
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- Light Rail Transit Line 2 (LRT 2) completed 
- Government Abrogated BOT contract of terminal 3 of Ninoy 
Aquino International Airport in Manila and expropriated the  
terminal  → sent mixed signal to the private sector 
- Allegations of corruption: North Rail project and National Board 
Band Network project both supported by Chinese government 
Aquino 
(2010-2
016) 
- Shifted to PPP Program → “PPP vs ODA” debate 
- Renamed BOT Center as PPP Center and attached it to NEDA 
- Sovereign credit ratings upgraded to investment grade 
- Decongestion plan of Metro Manila commenced 
2.9% 
Duterte 
(2016- ) 
- Dutertenomics, “Build, Build, Build” program, announced 
- Coming back to ODA + National Budget from PPP 
→ ”PPP vs ODA” debate 
- Decongestion of Metro Manila being planned and implemented 
- Long-term socio-economic plan “Ambisyon Natin 2040” (Our 
Ambition 2040) launched by NEDA  
6.8% (planned) 
Source: Created by author  
 
Policy reforms and developments related to infrastructure have been done mainly in the 
four areas; regulation, institution, finance and specific sectors. For financing aspect, 
there has been two channel, fiscal front and utilization of private fund. Considering 
high public debt and low revenues, each administration over the three decades 
introduced major fiscal reforms to finance development priorities, including public 
infrastructure. PPP related regulatory and institutional reforms have been introduced 
as well making the Philippines the best ASEAN environment for PPP as discussed. 
 
With these developments, fiscal situation, including public debt and deficit to GDP, 
generally improved over the years, though revenue and infrastructure spending to GDP 
have been low in comparison to other ASEAN neighbors. Policy reforms in specific 
sectors including power, water and telecommunications were noteworthy, though as 
discussed earlier, reforms had mixed results. 
  
One of the challenges of infrastructure development in the last three decades after 
Marcos administration is the continuity of policy and priority. It sometimes takes more 
than the presidential term of six year to complete a large infrastructure, considering 
every step of planning, financing, procurement and construction. Some larger 
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infrastructure may require master plan before going to feasibility study. This is part of 
reasons behind the lack of sufficient mass public transportation in Metro Manila3 
which is accelerating congestion in Metro Manila. Another policy shift over the 
administrations is PPP related policy which will be discussed in the next section.   
 
4. Drastic Policy Shift in PPP in the Philippines 
This section describes the drastic PPP policy change in the Aquino administration 
(2010-2016) and then discusses Dutertenomics which is another drastic change in PPP 
policy by the Duterte administration (2016-2022). 
 
4-1. Shift to PPP by the Aquino Administration 
The Aquino administration, which took office in 2010, reviewed the existing 
infrastructure development policies which depended mainly on government budget and 
ODA. As a result of the review, the administration prioritized infrastructure 
development and launched an aggressive PPP program in November 2010. Ten priority 
projects were identified, targeting about 4 billion USD in private capital. Based on this 
policy change, debate on "PPP vs ODA" became active in the Philippines. 
 
One of the first large-scale PPP projects launched by the Aquino administration was 
Manila’s “Ninoy Aquino International Airport Expressway Project”. The Project had 
been formulated as traditional publics work during the former Arroyo administration 
which handed it over to the Aquino administration. Based on this policy shift to PPP, 
the Aquino government changed the public works project to a PPP project. Through 
bidding, the government was able to obtain 11 billion pesos of premium, about 220 
million USD. This successful bidding greatly boosted the PPP plan of the Aquino 
Administration. 
 
The main achievements in PPP by the Aquino administration are as follows. 
 
(a) Government organization 
The administration reorganized the then BOT center, established under the 
Department of Trade and Industry in 1993, into PPP Center (PPPC) by Executive Order 
No. 8 in 2010, and transferred it under the National Economic Development Authority 
(NEDA). Main duties of PPPC are promotion of PPP Policy and assistance in 
formulation, implementation and monitoring of PPP projects.  
                                                   
3 Total length of LRT 1, LRT2 and MRT3 is 50.77 km. 
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As a result, the main roles of major government agencies in PPP became as follows. 
PPP Governing Board (PPPGB): Chaired by Director General of NEDA, and composed 
of relevant departments including Department of Finance (DOF), Department of 
Budget and Management (DBM). This Board is responsible for overall policy issues in 
PPP. 
NEDA: Review the appropriateness of specific PPP project, including validation of 
economic viability.  
Investment Coordination Committee (ICC): Approval of PPP project. 
DOF: Review risk sharing mechanism of specific PPP projects and the impact on 
government guarantees. 
PPPC: Support to make business plan for specific PPP projects. Regarding the pipeline 
of the PPP project under preparation, relevant information is disclosed in the PPPC's 
website which could attract potential private sector including outside of the Philippines. 
  
(b) Project Development Fund 
Project Development and Monitoring Facility (PDMF) was established in PPPC in 2010 
to support PPP project formation with the assistance of Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
and the Australian Government. Committed amount to PDMF is 42.9 million USD. This 
is a revolving fund meaning when the project is awarded successfully, the private 
sponsor will bear the cost of funds being used from PDMF. When the project was not 
awarded where Philippine government agency should be responsible for, then that 
agency will repay them in full to PDMF. If the project is terminated outside of the 
responsibility of the agency, the agency is obliged to repay half of fund utilized. 
According to PPPC, PDMF supported 35 PPP projects by the end of 2017. 
 
(c) PPP Fund 
In 2012, the Asian Development Bank (25 million USD), the Government Service 
Insurance System (GSIS) of the Philippines (400 million USD), the Netherlands pension 
fund, Algemene Pensioen Groep (APG), (150 million USD), and Australian Macquarie 
Infrastructure and Real Assets (MIRA) (50 million USD) established the Philippine 
Investment Alliance for Infrastructure Fund (PINAI Fund), the Philippine’s first 
private fund specializing in PPP (total fund size of $ 625 million). The fund already 
started investing in PPP projects including the electric power sector. Given the 
investment performance of the PINAI Fund, GSIS is considering the establishment of 
PINAI Fund 2. 
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(d) Relaxation of Single Borrowers' Limit 
In the Philippines, the role of domestic banks is important in promoting PPP 
infrastructure development. While local conglomerates are active in PPP projects, their 
banking arms faced issue in single borrowers’ limit (SBL). 
 
Central Bank of the Philippines sets single borrowers’ limit as 25% of net worth. 
However, the Central Bank added another 25% for SBL for PPP projects for the purpose 
of PPP promotion in 2010 until the end of 2013, later extended until the end of 2016.  
 
In 2010, when the Aquino administration started, the ratio of infrastructure 
development to GDP was 1.8%, but in 2015 it was increased to 4%. The average of six 
years of the administration was 2.9%, exceeding 1.9% of the Arroyo administration. The 
Aquino administration from June 2010 to June 2016, 28 PPP projects were approved by 
the government, however PPP contract was signed for 12 projects and 3 projects were 
completed4 by the end of the administration. 
 
4-2. Dutertenomics: Drastic Shift in PPP Policy 
In June 2016, when the Duterte administration took office, it announced 10-point 
Socio-Economic Agenda as the most important socio-economic priority. One of the 
agenda was about infrastructure and PPP; “Accelerating annual infrastructure 
spending to account for 5% of the gross domestic product (GDP), with public-private 
partnership playing a key role”. In April 2017, "Dutertenomics" was announced. The 
Dutertenomics includes acceleration of infrastructure investment, achievement of 
sustainable development, and investment promotion. Because its most important pillar 
was massive infrastructure improvement, Dutertenomics is also called as “Build, Build, 
Build program”. 
 
(a) Acceleration of Infrastructure Development 
During the term of the office until 2022, Dutertenomics plans infrastructure investment 
of 8.4 trillion pesos (about 168 billion USD), with 75 large-scale infrastructure projects. 
Moreover, the government plans to increase infrastructure investment rate with respect 
to GDP to 7.3% by 2022 making average rate during Duterte administration in 
                                                   
4  “Daang Hari-SLEX Link Road (Muntinlupa-Cavite Expressway) Project”, “PPP for 
School Infrastructure Project (PSIP) – Phase I”, and “Automatic Fare Collection 
System”. 
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2017-2022 as 6.8%5 which is significantly higher than the average of 2.9% for the 
Aquino government and 1.9% for the Arroyo administration. Among 75 large-scale 
infrastructure projects, railway sector is regarded as one of the most important sector 
which includes the Philippines’ first ever subway project, “Metro Manila Subway 
Project”, “Manila North-South Commuter Line (North) Project”, and “Manila 
North-South Commuter Line (South) Project”. 
 
There is a bill at Congress aiming at granting emergency power to the President which 
does not require the congress's approval for the purpose of further implementation of 
infrastructure projects, especially which contribute decongestion of Metro Manila. 
Currently the bill is still in the deliberation stage.  
 
(b) Shift from PPP to ODA 
As a financial resource of this large-scale infrastructure development plan, 
Dutertenomics made drastic shift from PPP to government budget and ODA. The 
debate of "PPP vs ODA" again became active in 2017 as a result.  
 
According to the Duterte administration, this policy shift was made because the Aquino 
administration was able to sign only 12 PPP contracts and complete the only 3 projects 
although 28 projects were approved.6. This was mainly caused by the delay in PPP 
bidding process which involved various inquiries from private parties sometimes 
involving judicial branch. In some cases, contract negotiation was lengthened after 
bidding. Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) (2015) argues that controversies related to 
bidding and award procedures for major transport infrastructure projects indicate 
certain weaknesses in public-sector decision-making and the whole process can be 
inefficient due to the length of time it takes to reach a final decision. 
 
However, it should be noted that above factors mentioned including delay in bidding 
process, prolonged contract negotiation, controversies related to the bidding and award 
procedures including lawsuits filed by losing bidders are not inherent issues in PPP 
projects. Rather, these problems can happen in traditional procurement through 
                                                   
5 In 2017, the ratio was 5.4%. 
6 In a speech during general membership meeting of Management Association of the 
Philippines on May 30, 2017, NEDA Undersecretary mentioned as follows: “In the 
period 2010 to 2016, of the 28 PPP projects approved by the NEDA Board, 50 percent or 
14 PPP projects have yet to be implemented or was discontinued or terminated.  In 
comparison, for ODA and locally-financed projects, at least 80 percent are currently 
ongoing or have been completed. “ 
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government budget and ODA. Causes for these delay could be the result of weaknesses 
in public-sector decision-making as argued by EIU (2015) and lack of enough capacities 
of the public sector rather than characteristics inherent in PPP scheme.    
 
Moreover, many government departments and agencies are involved in the planning, 
contracting, and executing of large-scale infrastructure projects. Therefore there is 
always the challenge for smooth coordination across multiple departments and agencies. 
In response to this, in 2017, Project Facilitation, Monitoring and Innovation (PFMI) 
Task Force was established at NEDA with the purpose of monitoring and promoting the 
implementation of PPP projects and other priority projects included in Dutertenomics. 
It needs further follow-up as to whether this PFMI Task Force will deliver results. 
 
At the time of the start of the Duterte administration, six projects were in the bidding 
stage as PPP, of which four projects have been changed to ODA projects and the 
remaining two projects canceled by government decision. The Aquino administration 
focused on solicited PPP scheme, making unsolicited PPP scheme as an exception. 
However, Duterte administration made positon that it welcomes both solicited and 
unsolicited PPP.  
 
(c) Hybrid PPP 
Dutertenomics is not a complete shift from PPP to the public sector/ODA. The 
Government priority is to complete the construction phase by the public sector while 
leaving operation and maintenance to the private sector. They call it "Hybrid PPP" 
scheme. This is to utilize the highly capable private expertise in operation and 
maintenance, while spending budget and ODA for construction at lower cost. Although 
this is not popular scheme in other parts of the world, there are several PPP projects 
under this scheme in the Philippines including “Subic-Clark-Tarlac Expressway 
Project”. 
 
In the bidding and negotiation process before a PPP contract, it is necessary to carefully 
study and negotiate how to share risk between public and private sectors. In the case of 
ordinary PPP projects, it is necessary to conduct these study and negotiation before 
construction, leading to possible delay in the start of the construction phase. For this 
reason, "hybrid PPP” is government priority. Construction stage can be started with 
government finance or ODA first while during the construction period, bidding and 
contract negotiation for operation and maintenance of PPP project after completion 
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could be done so that loss of time could be minimized. By this "hybrid PPP" scheme, 
public sector will bear risks in the construction phase like traditional public 
procurement. It can be said that this scheme is an attempt to simplify procedures and 
process to speed up project implementation.  
 
The hybrid PPP scheme may shorten preparation and implementation time, however 
there are several issues of hybrid PPP scheme that need for careful studies. First, risks 
during construction, which is one of the biggest risks in infrastructure development, 
will be shouldered by the government and not by the private proponent in hybrid PPP. 
Second, since the planning and design, including carrying capacity and alignment, of 
the project will be solely determined by the public, demand risk may not be shouldered 
by the private sector. Third, there is possible conflict or tension between the firm which 
builds the infrastructure and operates/maintains it, if problems occur after construction. 
In other words, there is interface risk. Fourth, the design, specifications, standards and 
systems of the infrastructure decided at the construction stage, may limit the private 
sector that can participate in the operation and maintenance stage.  
 
Therefore, by pursuing “hybrid PPP”, utilization of some benefits of PPP as pointed out 
by the World Bank Institute (2014) as “Whole-of-life costing: Full integration 
incentivizes the single party to complete each project function (design, build, operate, 
maintain) in a way that minimizes total costs” may not be achieved. For this reason, it 
is necessary to involve or even share with the interested private entities some 
information of the project including design, specification, and standards in early stage 
of the construction7. Also, it should be noted that in some ODA, the procurement 
condition is tied to specific countries that may affect PPP bidding for operation and 
maintenance after the construction phase. 
 
(d) Financial Source of Dutertenomics 
Duterte administration emphasizes the ODA and tax reform as a financial source of 
large-scale infrastructure development plan by the government. Regarding the former, 
the Philippine government has expectation for multilateral institutions including Asian 
Development Bank, which used to focus mainly on program loans but now active in 
infrastructure. As for bilateral donors, Japan, China and South Korea are high on the 
list, especially Japan for “Quality infrastructure Initiative” and China for “One Belt 
                                                   
7 By doing these, it may take longer and, in the end, Hybrid PPP may not save time as 
originally planned.  
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One Road Initiative”. The government also expects AIIB, Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank, in this sector as well. 
 
By utilizing ODA, the government could source fund with relatively longer-term 
maturity and concessional terms8 than private money through PPP. However, it needs 
to consider issues including foreign debt and government fiscal burden in the case of 
ODA9. Also, as mentioned above, in some ODA, the procurement condition is tied to 
specific countries that may not be economical nor best quality in view of a life cycle of 
the infrastructure. ODA borrowing also bears foreign exchange risk unless it is 
denominated in Philippine Peso.  
 
As for the tax reform, the government expects to increase revenues by reducing VAT 
exemption items, increasing tax on automobiles, gasoline, and sweetened beverages and 
other measures. The first tax reform was passed in 2017 by Congress. The government 
is preparing a second package of tax reform including review of incentives for foreign 
direct investment, which is causing some controversies among foreign investors. 
 
The Philippine public debt to GDP has decreased to 32.6% (2017) from its recent peak of 
68.0% recorded in 2003. In addition, the ratio of public interest payment in government 
expenditure is at a low of 13.9% (2017). Due to this relatively stable fiscal situation, the 
government is in the position that large-scale infrastructure projects can be promoted 
without depending too much on PPP. The Philippine government has formulated a fund 
procurement plan of “80% domestic borrowing and 20% overseas borrowing in principle” 
in order to ease the influence of external shocks. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Section 4 stated that there were two major policy shifts in infrastructure development 
recently; first from public to PPP in 2010 and second one from PPP to public in 2017. 
Both shifts triggered debate of "PPP vs ODA" in the Philippines. However, it is not 
realistic to develop all necessary infrastructure which lags behind ASEAN peer 
                                                   
8 Many development financial institutions and bilateral donors determine terms and 
conditions of ODA money by recipient country’s income category. Currently, the 
Philippines is categories in “lower-middle income”, since current GNI per capita is USD 
3,660 by the World Bank Atlas of 2018. However, if GNI per capita surpass USD 3,896 
which is threshold of “upper-middle income” for “country classifications by income level: 
2018-2019” of the World Bank, terms and conditions of the borrowing will be less 
concessional.      
9 In case of PPP, there may be issues including contingent liabilities. 
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countries by public alone. Therefore, it is not about "PPP vs ODA", but how to promote 
complementary relations between the public and PPP/private in consideration of the 
characteristics the specific project and the PPP related environment both domestically 
and internationally. In other words, the Philippines should consider “PPP and ODA”. In 
this context, PPP in the Philippines should be further promoted and its PPP 
environment should be further improved.  
 
As mentioned above, during the Aquino administration, the Philippines PPP 
environment was greatly improved. According to the EIU (2015), the country’s PPP 
environment was categorized as “Developed” as the only country in ASEAN. The 
Duterte administration started promoting infrastructure development through public 
investment, nevertheless the country’s PPP institutions and support systems are 
sustained. 
 
The Philippines needs to accelerate infrastructure development which lags behind 
neighboring ASEAN countries. Currently, the Duterte administration is steadily 
securing financial resources from international development financial institutions and 
bilateral donors including ADB, Japan, China, Korea, and AIIB. The administration has 
also increased government revenue through tax reform. 
 
However, the Philippines is no exception in the overall macro-economic downside risk 
that is beginning to be seen among emerging countries. Recent inflation and peso 
depreciation added to Basel III regulatory requirements may also affect PPP 
environment negatively. Furthermore, if the Philippine government bonds currently 
rated as investment grade falls, there is risk that the cost of raising funds will rise. 
 
It is noted that support for PPP is being expanded in ODA operations globally. To 
illustrate this, followings are some of major recent developments. 
- World Bank: The bank increased paid-in capital of USD 5.5 billion for private sector 
window of the bank, IFC, in 2018.  
- ADB: The bank plans to boost its private sector operations to reach one-third of ADB 
operations by 202410 which includes scaling up support for PPP. 
- OECD: The organization has been advocating the concept of “blended finance11”, an 
                                                   
10 “Strategy 2030” by ADB (2018) 
11 “Blended finance” is defined as activities that combine “concessional public finance 
with non-concessional private finance and expertise from the public and private sector, 
special-purpose vehicles, non-recourse project financing, risk mitigation instruments 
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approach to mix different forms of capital in support of development, which includes 
PPP since 2015.  
- USA: The BUILD Act, Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development 
Act, was signed into law in 2018. It establishes a new agency, the US International 
Development Finance Corporation (IDFC) whose mission is to mobilize private 
sector capital and skills for the economic benefit of less developed countries. It is 
expected that PPP will be one of main operations of IDFC  
- Japan: “Infrastructure System Export Strategy”, where PPP is one of the main 
agenda, was formulated in 2013 and is revised yearly. 
 
However, support for PPP through ODA faces with several challenges including limited 
number of “bankable” projects, less developed regulatory framework, institutional 
capacity, and financial support on the side of recipient government.  
 
Therefore, in terms of infrastructure development in the Philippines, from the 
viewpoint of "PPP & ODA" rather than "PPP vs ODA", it is necessary to further improve 
PPP environment in order to strengthen mutual complementarity between public and 
PPP/private.  
 
At present, discussions are in progress in congress to shift to federalism from unitary 
government system in the Philippines. This is one of the election promises of President 
Duterte. Although many PPP projects are implemented in the Metro Manila area, PPP 
projects outside of Metro Manila including Cebu, the second biggest city, and Davao, the 
third biggest city, are also being formulated, planned, and implemented. When shift to 
the federal system is implemented, it may create another uncertainty in PPP 
environment in the country.  
 
About two years have passed since the launch of Dutertenomics. It is still too early to 
evaluate this policy shift. It needs more time to monitor the progress of large-scale 
infrastructure projects listed in Dutertenomics; its implication to the speediness of 
project preparation, bidding and implementation, as well as to its cost and user fee.  
 
PPP projects developed and approved during the Aquino administration will be 
completing and getting into operation and maintenance phase. The success or failure of 
                                                                                                                                                     
and pooled funding structures.” (Paragraph 48 of The Addis Ababa Action Agenda of 3rd 
International Conference on Finance for Development in 2015)   
19 
 
the PPP project can be determined not only at the construction stage but also at the 
operation and maintenance stage: whether efficient and effective infrastructure services 
can be provided at an appropriate fee, if forecast including demand for the project is 
within the range assumed by the private participants, and if public interest is protected. 
Therefore further validations are expected on the results of these PPP projects. 
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